Consider a bottleneck monopoly that sells "access" at a regulated price and may compete with independent downstream …rms through a subsidiary. We systematically study the vertical integration decision and the optimal intensity of sabotage.
Introduction
In many network industries bottleneck monopolies produce inputs for competitive …rms and their access charges are regulated. 1 It is well known, however, that price regulation stimulates sabotagethe intentional degrading of quality of service to raise the costs of downstream competitors. 2 This problem is believed to be important in practice and it has generated a large literature dissecting the determinants of the sabotage decision. 3;4 Seminal contributions by Weisman (1995) and Economides (1998) pointed out many of the determinants of the sabotage decision, but reached seemingly contradictory conclusions. While Weisman's results suggested that the bottleneck monopolist may not have any incentives to discriminate against downstream rivals, Economides's indicated that it may want to go all the way until excluding independent …rms altogether. 5 Research by Beard et al. (2001) , Bergman (2000) , Mandy (2000) and Rei¤en (1998) signi…cantly clari…ed the points at issue. True, the incentives to sabotage are weak or even nonexistent when the access charge is close to the bottleneck monopolist's unregulated optimum or the subsidiary is considerably less e¢ cient than independent …rms. But, on the other hand, the bottleneck monopoly will want to sabotage when price regulation constrains its upstream market power. Moreover, as Mandy (2000) reports, the subsidiary would have to be implausibly ine¢ cient to rule out sabotage.
Hence, there is no a priory presumption in favor of one or the other-it all depends on the data.
Further research has clari…ed these issues even more. So by now it is well known that whether sabotage pays depends on several factors: the cost of sabotage (Mandy[2000] , Rei¤en [1998], Weisman [1995, 1998] ); the shape of the downstream cost function (Mandy [2000] ); the size of the upstream margin granted by the regulated access charge (Beard et al. [2001] , Bergman [2000] , Engel et al. [2003] , Kondaurova and Weisman [2003] , La¤ont and Tirole [2000, section 4 .5], Mandy [2000] , Rei¤en [1998] , Sand [2004] , Weisman [2001] ); the subsidiary's market share in the downstream market (Kondaurova and Weisman [2003] , Sibley and Weisman [1998a,b] , Weisman [1995] ); the intensity and type of downstream competition (Mandy [2000 (Mandy [ , 2001 ); and the extent of downstream product di¤erentiation (Kondaurova and Weisman [2003] , Mandy and Sappington [2006] , Rei¤en [1998] , Sibley and Weisman [2005] , Weisman [1995] ). 6 1 For example, electricity generators need transmission and distribution facilities to reach retail consumers; ISPs, long distance carriers and mobile phone providers need access to the …xed local loop; and natural gas producers need pipelines to reach retailers. 2 In the literature sabotage is also known as non-price discrimination. For example, the bottleneck monopoly may impose costly technical requirements to interconnection; delay interconnection adducing "technical problems"; choose closed standards that make some technologies incompatible; degrade the quality of service by inducing periodic breakdowns of service to independent …rms; and so on. 3 For surveys see Mandy (2000) and Sappington (2005 Sappington ( , 2006 . 4 For evidence on discrimination see Mini (2001) , Rei¤en et al. (2000) and Rei¤en and Ward (2002) . 5 In any case, Weisman (1995, p.257 ) was careful to indicate that the no-sabotage result obtains when the bottleneck monopoly's aim is to lower the equilibrium downstream price to stimulate the demand for access. 6 See Mandy (2000) for a summary.
2 Also, a central trade o¤ has been identi…ed: sabotage increases pro…ts made downstream, but reduces access charge revenue (Rei¤en [1998] , Sibley and Weisman [1998a] , Weisman [1995] ) and may, as Mandy (2000) puts it, "kill the goose that may have laid the golden egg." And there also seems to be a regulatory tradeo¤: vertical integration may stimulate sabotage but generates vertical economies of scope. 7 Thus, vertical integration has ambiguous e¤ects on social and consumer welfare (Rei¤en [1998] , Crew et al. [2005] , Sappington [2006] ). 8 This paper aims towards the consolidation of this literature by systematically studying how the decision to integrate and the intensity of sabotage vary with fundamental cost and demand parameters. It is, in essence, a comparative statics exercise which uni…es in a single model a number of results that appear in the literature and links both the vertical integration and sabotage decisions with observable market parameters and outcomes. We obtain some new results and show that the intensity of sabotage depends ultimately on two simple, mutually exclusive, conditions: either a relation between the subsidiary's market share and the elasticity of the derived demand for access; or a standard Lerner condition augmented by the direct cost of sabotage. These standard conditions yield approximate quantitative estimates which are helpful to gauge whether sabotage should be a concern in a speci…c circumstance and industry.
We study a perfectly competitive downstream market with free entry where independent …rms with U-shaped average cost curves produce an homogeneous good. 9 A bottleneck monopoly sells access to independent …rms at a regulated and exogenous access charge , which is greater than marginal cost. It can sabotage independent …rms and raise both their cost of entry (i.e. sabotage is akin to a barrier to entry) and their variable cost of production (i.e. sabotage raises rivals' costs). The aim of sabotage is to increase the pro…ts of the bottleneck's monopoly subsidiary. This subsidiary operates m plants that produce each quantity at 1 times the cost of an independent plant. 10 Essentially, we make the integration decision endogenous (like Beard et al. [2001] ) and study how the incentives to sabotage vary with the subsidiary's size m and vertical economies (or diseconomies) of scope , this for a given access charge and sabotage cost function.
To begin, we …nd that vertical integration does not increase consumer welfare in the long run, unless the subsidiary is implausibly more e¢ cient than independent …rms. 11 The economics is simple. In a market with free entry price is …xed by the average cost of entrants. If the bottleneck 7 For a de…nition of vertical econnomies of scope see Kaserman and Mayo (1991, p. 488 ). 8 Beard et al. (2001) show that this regulatory tradeo¤ can be relaxed if entry into the upstream segment can be successfully promoted. 9 Quirmbach (1986) also models a perfectly competitive downstream market with free entry, but he is neither concerned about regulated industries nor sabotage.
1 0 > 0 models vertical economies of scope; < 0 models vertical diseconomies of scope. 1 1 For example, let the average cost of independent …rms be 100. If the elasticity of demand is 2, and the access charge increases the cost of independent …rms by 20% to 120, then the subsidiary's cost net of access charges would have to be at most 60 (i.e. 40% lower) for vertical integration to bene…t consumers. With lower elasticities the cost advantage has to be even larger. 3 monopoly sabotages, the cost of independent …rms and the equilibrium price is higher than with vertical separation. If, on the other hand, the bottleneck monopoly does not sabotage, vertical integration does not a¤ect the equilibrium price-unless, of course, the subsidiary's cost advantage is such that the unconstrained monopoly price is less than the entrant's cost. But this only can occur when the subsidiary's cost advantage is very large. In addition, we also …nd that sabotage may prompt ine¢ cient vertical integration-a subsidiary with higher costs produces only because the bottleneck monopoly can sabotage. In that case welfare falls unambiguously.
The previous results illustrate a more general point, namely that observed parameters and downstream market structure give information about the likelihood of sabotage and its intensity. Sand [2004] ). But we show that the argument of relaxing price regulation in order to prevent sabotage is probably weak. For example, if the elasticity of demand is 1:1, the monopolist's pro…t-maximizing access charge is 10 times the downstream cost; if the elasticity is 3, the monopolist's pro…t-maximizing access charge equals 50% of the downstream cost-values which are well beyond the share of access charges in the cost of most network industries.
Our model also clari…es the equilibrium relation between sabotage and the three possible downstream market outcomes: coexistence, exclusion of independent …rms and vertical separation.
When the subsidiary and independent …rms coexist in equilibrium, the optimal tradeo¤ between downstream pro…ts and access charge revenue can be made more precise: for sabotage to emerge it is necessary for the subsidiary's market share to be greater than the elasticity of the derived demand for access. And, moreover, equilibrium sabotage is increasing in this di¤erence.
Thus, sabotage is not of much concern if demand for the downstream good is very elastic and the share of the access charge in the downstream price is large. But in many cases of practical relevance quite the contrary occurs: demand is inelastic or the share of the access charge in the downstream price is not large. For example, if the elasticity of the residential demand for energy is 0:3 and the share of distribution costs in the …nal price of energy is 40%, a distributor who competes with independent retailers would necessarily refrain from sabotage only if its market share is 14% or less. 12 Interestingly, we …nd that with coexistence the intensity of sabotage increases with economies of scope: then the subsidiary's market share is larger which makes sabotage more attractive at the margin. Thus, consumers are hurt by economies of scope.
The incentives to sabotage work quite di¤erently when the subsidiary excludes independent …rms by limit pricing them, for then sabotage has no opportunity cost. Exclusion may happen either because the direct cost of sabotage is low, the subsidiary is more e¢ cient than independent 1 2 These numbers come from actual data of the Chilean market. 4 …rms or the subsidiary is large. But in all cases the aim of sabotage is to bring the downstream price closer to the monopolist's unconstrained optimum. Indeed, optimal sabotage is determined by a standard Lerner condition augmented by the direct cost of sabotage. Contrary to coexistence, optimal sabotage falls with economies of scope, for the same reason that a textbook monopolist charges less when its cost falls.
As said before, sabotage not only hurts consumers but may prompt ine¢ cient vertical integration. We show that a bottleneck monopoly who su¤ers diseconomies of scope may vertically integrate and even limit price rivals out of the market only because it can sabotage; it would never integrate without sabotage. Moreover, we also …nd that ine¢ cient vertical integration tends to occur when the subsidiary is large. At some point, however, diseconomies of scope and the opportunity cost of sabotage become too large and the monopolist is better o¤ if vertically separated.
Thus, we …nd, in line with the literature, that when the subsidiary is considerably less e¢ cient than independent …rms, the bottleneck monopoly does not sabotage. Yet, when the integration decision is endogenous, one should observe vertical separation-there should be no subsidiary to begin with.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present the model and derive some preliminary results. Section 3 studies vertical integration with sabotage. Section 4 concludes with policy implications and some suggestions for further research.
The model 2.1. Model description
Production A bottleneck monopoly produces access at zero marginal cost and sells it at a regulated access charge to a continuum of n identical and perfectly competitive …rms in the downstream market. Like Quirmbach (1986) , but in departure with most of the literature on sabotage, we assume that measure n is endogenously determined by free entry.
Each …rm uses access in …xed proportions to produce an homogeneous good with cost function
where k is the …xed investment cost; c is the total variable cost of operation; s 0 is the intensity of sabotage-sabotage s increases costs by (100 s) %. We assume c q ; c> 0, that is c is an increasing and convex function of production q (the supply curve is strictly increasing.)
If the bottleneck monopolist vertically integrates into the downstream market it operates a subsidiary who owns a measure m > 0 of plants, each with cost function (1 )C(q), where 2 ( 1; 1). When > 0 there are vertical economies of scope: plants owned by the subsidiary have lower costs for any given production q. When < 0 there are diseconomies of scope. In addition, we assume that m is exogenous-thus, diminishing returns eventually set in and coexistence can emerge in equilibrium. Given this, the subsidiary is fully characterized by a pair (m; ). Hence, in what follows we will refer to "subsidiary (m; )." Q M is the total quantity produced by subsidiary (m; ). The subsidiary will minimize costs by producing q M = Q M =m in each plant and its total cost function is m(1 )C(q M ).
REMARK (The e¤ect of sabotage): Note that sabotage increases both the cost of setting up a plant (the entry cost) and the variable cost. Also, in agreement with most of the literature, we assume that sabotage does not increase the subsidiary's cost-its e¤ect is asymmetric. 13 As Beard et al. (2001) point out, these speci…c characteristics di¤er somewhat from the traditional strategies to raise rivals' costs described by Krattenmaker and Salop (1986) in that they involve non-price conditions of supply and provide neither direct nor indirect control of the independent …rms'outputs. Also, in their seminal papers Sche¤man (1983, 1987) have in mind horizontal cost-raising strategies, not a bottleneck monopoly as in the sabotage literature.
Moreover, they assume that cost-raising strategies increase average and marginal costs of rivals, and the average cost of the saboteur.
REMARK (Perfect competition and free entry):
Assuming a continuum of …rms is just a technical devise to avoid the integer problem; it is a standard assumption in the literature, for example see Quirmbach (1986) . It ensures that the equilibrium with free entry exists and that we can use standard di¤erentiation to perform comparative statics. 14 The substantive assumptions are free entry and perfect competition. Are they warranted?
During the last 20 years network industries have been restructured and deregulated in many countries. The premise is that returns to scale are not signi…cant in some segments. Consequently, these can be opened to competition and functionally separated from bottleneck monopolies. For example, in electricity generation the minimum e¢ cient scale (MES) is between 300 and 500 MW, which is far smaller than most electrical systems. 15 Thus, generation can be liberalized, but high voltage transmission, a natural monopoly, must be regulated. Sea shipping is quite competitive, but economies of scale in ports are signi…cant and some, especially in small countries, are bottleneck monopolies. Similarly, telecom service providers like ISPs or long-distance carriers do not seem to enjoy signi…cant economies of scale, but density economies in the local loop are important.
Of course, perfect competition (or contestability) might seem an extreme assumption nonetheless. But even in sectors where a few …rms capture a signi…cant market share, like in electricity 1 3 For an analysis when sabotage also rises the cost of the saboteur see Sibley and Weisman (2005) . 1 4 In addition, notice that our analysis would also apply had we assumed that the cost function c has a ‡at bottom at the optimum level of production, which is one avenue followed in the literature to ensure existence when the number of …rms is an integer (see Baumol et al. [1982, p. 32-36] ). 1 5 For example, installed capacity in the main system of a small country like Chile is around 8,000 MW. 6 generation, markets may be close to contestable and long-run prices determined by the costs of the marginal entrant. For example, Newbery (1999, pp. 217-18) argues that long-term contracts made entry contestable in the British electricity market. A distributor could sign a …fteen-year long contract with an independent power producer (IPP) who would build a gas-…red plant. This forced incumbents to sign contracts at prices comparable to those that IPPs could o¤er.
Demand D is the demand for the good and Q = D(p) is the quantity demanded at price p. Also,
pD is the elasticity of demand. In order to ensure regularity of the solution we assume that the demand function satis…es the following property:
That is, the demand curve generates a downward-sloping marginal revenue curve as a function of Q. This is the standard demand curve drawn in the textbook monopoly example.
Sabotage technology As in most of the literature, the bottleneck monopoly can increase the cost of independent …rms by degrading the quality of the input. Sabotage intensity s costs the bottleneck monopoly (s), with (0) = 0, 0 0 and 00 0. Notice that these may refer to the direct costs of sabotage as well as …nancial …nes imposed by regulators or image costs if caught. In addition, we allow costless sabotage.
REMARK (The direct cost of sabotage):
There is no agreement in the literature about the cost of sabotaging. Mandy (2000) points out that the direct cost of some sabotage activities like issuing standards that are costly for rival …rms may be very small, but the cost of in ‡uence activities to obtain regulations that damage competitors or, on the other hand, of regulatory and antitrust backlash if sabotage is convincingly revealed, may be substantial. 16 Here we allow sabotage to be either costless (when 1 6 Weisman and Kang (2001) estimate the detection probability that deters sabotage when the penalty is large. 1 7 Sappington (2006b), Weisman (1999) and Weisman and Kang (2001) assume a threshold such that, if exceeded, the saboteur is discovered and punished with probability 1-a particular case of convex costs. Rei¤en (1998) argues that sabotage may even reduce the bottleneck monopoly's cost, as reliable service to rivals should cost more than poor service. But see Weisman's (1998) reply.
Timing The timing of actions is as follows. First, the bottleneck monopolist decides whether to establish a subsidiary and sabotage intensity s. Then independent …rms decide whether to enter the downstream market by sinking k(1 + s). Last, independent …rms and the subsidiary compete.
The intensity of sabotage and equilibrium in the downstream market
The decision of independent …rms Assume that the bottleneck monopoly sabotages s > 0.
Then each independent …rm chooses optimal production given and s, call it q (s). But free entry and perfect competition implies that q (s) equals the MES given and s. Hence, the equilibrium price will equal the minimum average cost of an independent …rm given and s. Now it can be shown that for all and s, q (s) = q 0 , where q 0 is the MES with = s = 0 (see Lemma A.1 in Appendix A for a formal proof). It follows that in equilibrium
Note that we do not need to know the amount produced by the subsidiary to obtain p (s)-the equilibrium price is determined by independent …rms. It follows that the bottleneck monopolist cannot extend its market power just by vertically integrating, no matter its size.
The subsidiary and sabotage How much will the subsidiary produce? Assume …rst that the subsidiary coexists with independent …rms in equilibrium. Given , m and s it will equate marginal cost to p (s). Thus, in equilibrium q M (s) is such that
(which implies that q M > q 0 if s > 0 18 ) and Q M (s) = mq M (s). Note that the access charge is also part of the subsidiary's marginal cost. Why? With perfect competition the subsidiary's production substitutes for output from independent …rms one by one. Hence, each unit sold has an opportunity cost, the lost access charge . 19 
REMARK (Notation):
We write Q M (s) for Q M (p (s)) and q M (s) for q M (p (s)). More generally, in what follows we will sometimes abuse notation and omit function arguments to reduce clutter.
It also follows from condition (2.2) that the subsidiary's production and market share will increase with s. Figure 1 , which depicts market demand and the marginal cost function of a given subsidiary (m; ), shows this condition graphically. Let M be the access charge that maximizes the pro…t of a vertically-separated bottleneck monopoly. Figure 2 also assumes that < M = cq(q0)=(" 1). 2 1 The frontiers between regions are not necessarily straight lines, but they are always downward sloping. Nevertheless, let n be the number of independent …rms that would enter the market when the access charge is and the monopolist does not establish a subsidiary. Then it is always true that LP (n ) = 0.
In Region I both m and are large and the subsidiary e¢ ciently excludes …rms: the unconstrained monopoly price, call it p M , is less than the equilibrium price p (0) which would prevail if only independent …rms would sell in the downstream market. 22 We call this "e¢ cient exclusion" (EE). Note that along locus EE (m), p M = p (0).
Subsidiaries in Region II still optimally exclude …rms. Nevertheless, since p M > p (0), they charge p (0) and limit price …rms. Total production and sales equal, of course, D(p (0)), regardless of m and . We call this "limit pricing."
Now if m is small and economies of scope are weak then we are in Region III. The bottleneck monopoly vertically integrates but the equilibrium price is still p (0) and part of D(p (0)) is produced by independent …rms. We call this "coexistence."
Last, in Region IV < 0, and the subsidiary su¤ers diseconomies of scope. Then the bottleneck monopoly does not vertically integrate.
Basically, vertical integration is pro…table when m and are such that the subsidiary is more e¢ cient than independent …rms, at least before diminishing returns set in; in Appendix B we prove that this occurs whenever there are some economies of scope, however small. On the contrary, if there are diseconomies of scope the bottleneck monopoly does not vertically integrate. Figure 3 is the analogue of Figure 2 , but now we assume that the bottleneck monopoly can sabotage. As can be seen, there are two types of (m; ) combinations such that there is no sabotage in equilibrium:
Vertical integration with sabotage
(Region A) On the one hand, when both m and are large and the subsidiary is very e¢ cient.
Then the bottleneck monopoly vertically integrates and the subsidiary excludes independent …rms by optimally setting a low price. Some, namely subsidiaries (m; ) such that p M < p (0), will just set their unconstrained monopoly price (Region A[i], which is the same as Region I in Figure 2 ). But there will also be subsidiaries (m; ) such that p M > p (0), who limit price but do not sabotage (Region A[ii]).
(Region D):
On the other hand, the bottleneck monopolist will not sabotage when either m or are small enough. Small subsidiaries that enjoy some economies of scope will vertically 2 2 Obviously, if alone, the subsidiary would choose pM de…ned by
integrate, but their sales are too small to reap net bene…ts from the increase in price wrought by sabotage. Subsidiaries which su¤er diseconomies of scope that are not compensated by size (Region E) will not even be observed, because then vertical integration is not pro…table.
Consider now subsidiaries (m; ) that prompt the bottleneck monopoly to vertically integrate and sabotage; these are in regions B and C.
With subsidiaries (m; ) in Region B sabotage will be used to increase the equilibrium price to p (s) > p (0) and limit-price independent …rms.
Subsidiaries (m; ) in Region C coexist with independent …rms, which are sabotaged.
Interestingly, now subsidiaries who su¤er diseconomies of scope but are large enough prompt the monopolist to vertically integrate because it can sabotage (regions B[ii] and C[ii]). As we will see, raising the cost of independent …rms through sabotage compensates diseconomies of scope, and size makes sabotage pro…table.
Last, note the arrows in Regions B and C. These indicate how the intensity of sabotage varies with and m. When independent …rms and the subsidiary coexist (Region C), the intensity of sabotage increases with economies of scope and the subsidiary's size. By contrast, with limit pricing (Region B) the intensity of sabotage falls with and m.
The basic economics of sabotage

Sabotage always increases p and hurts consumers
The …rst result is that sabotage always increases p (s) and hurts consumers.
Result 3.1. dp ds = c q (q 0 ) > 0 and d 2 p ds 2 = 0.
Proof. In equilibrium p (s) = (1 + s)c q (q 0 ) + , thus p is linear in s.
In principle, one might think that there is a trade o¤ between sabotage on the one hand and vertical integration and economies of scope on the other. Result 3.1 shows that, from the point of view of consumers, there is no trade o¤, regardless of economies of scope. The economics is simple: the aim of sabotage is to increase the price received by the subsidiary. Indeed, we will see next that sabotage intensi…es with economies of scope when independent …rms and the subsidiary coexist.
The sabotage decision
Sabotage with coexistence: the central trade o¤ Consider …rst Region C in Figure 3 . Such subsidiaries coexist with independent …rms and the intensity of sabotage, s o , maximizes
Note that Q M is a function of s, because for a given intensity of sabotage the subsidiary chooses Q M optimally according to equation (2.2) and one can derive an implicit function Q M (s). Thus, the …rst order condition that de…nes optimal sabotage s o is
Condition (3.2) shows the trade o¤ behind the sabotage decision. The …rst term, Q M dp ds , is the increase in the value of the subsidiary's sales wrought by the higher price. Against this bene…t, two costs are traded o¤. 0 (s o ) is, of course, the direct cost. But sabotage also has an opportunity cost, which is captured by the term D 0 dp ds . The higher price reduces the use of the bottleneck monopoly one-by-one with the fall of consumption of the …nal good, D 0 dp ds , and this translates one-by-one to smaller sales of access to independent …rms-in words of Mandy (2000) , sabotage might have killed the goose that laid the golden egg. where Q M =D is the monopolist's market share and p " is the elasticity of the derived demand for access in the case of …xed proportions (see e.g. Brofenbrenner [1961] ) . The basic trade o¤ is neatly summarized by the term in parenthesis, p ". On the one hand, a larger market share stimulates sabotage, because a given increase in p returns more revenue for the bottleneck monopoly. On the other hand, the intensity of sabotage falls with a more elastic derived demand for access -the "killing the goose" e¤ect. Now ultimately the subsidiary's market share depends on its size and e¢ ciency. Thus how does the intensity of sabotage vary with m and ? A straightforward application of the implicit function theorem shows that @s o @m = q M dp ds > 0
the second order condition. Hence:
With coexistence the intensity of sabotage increases with size and economies of scope.
It may not be surprising to …nd that size and vertical integration are deleterious to consumers.
But it is probably somewhat surprising that economies of scope, far from bene…tting consumers, actually hurt them. Why? The reason is that a more e¢ cient subsidiary has a larger market share ceteris paribus, which makes sabotage more pro…table at the margin.
Note, last, that the second order condition (3.4) is informative. Because dQ M dp > 0, it is necessary for coexistence either a convex cost of sabotage or a very concave demand. Otherwise, the FOC identi…es a minimum and the bottleneck monopoly would sabotage to exclude independent …rms. Thus, the mere fact that we observe coexistence in practice suggests that bottleneck monopolies cannot sabotage at will and incur costs when they do so (for further technical details see the Remark in Appendix C).
Sabotage with limit pricing: extending monopoly power Consider next Region B, where the subsidiary limit prices and the bottleneck monopoly sabotages in equilibrium. Now the problem is to maximize
This time the …rst order condition is
All the economics is in the term in brackets, which is proportional to
and resembles the Lerner condition. With limit pricing the subsidiary's market share equals 100%
and sabotage has no opportunity cost. Instead, it becomes a means to push the downstream price closer to p M , the monopoly price. Indeed, that's the price the subsidiary would charge if 0 = 0 for all s. With costly sabotage, the inequality is strict and the optimal price p (s o ) is lower than p M .
What is now the relation between size and e¢ ciency on the one hand, and sabotage on the other? Another application of the implicit function theorem yields Essentially, p (s o ) is closer to p M the larger and more e¢ cient the subsidiary. Thus, with stronger economies of scope or a larger size, less is gained by sabotaging a bit more.
The maximum intensity of sabotage Thus, we have seen that the intensity of sabotage increases with m and if the subsidiary coexists; on the contrary, it falls with m and if the subsidiary limit prices. It follows that there exists a maximum intensity of sabotage, call it s max o , which is chosen with subsidiaries that are just indi¤erent between coexistence and limit pricing.
Indi¤erence indicates where to look to characterize s max o . On the one hand, coexistence implies that price is determined by the independent …rm's marginal cost, viz. The result follows after we notice that monopolist (m; " ) maximizes its pro…ts selecting sabotage intensity s o (m; ) and not s o (m; 0). But the second term equals zero because of free entry, hence total pro…ts are D(p (0)).
Sabotage makes vertical integration pro…table because it reduces the relative cost disadvantage of a subsidiary with < 0 and increases the equilibrium price. Thus, the subsidiary can sell at a higher price and pro…t by vertically integrating.
When sabotage isn' t a concern
We now examine three cases such that sabotage is not a concern. In each case we discuss whether such conditions will be met in practice.
An unregulated bottleneck monopoly doesn' t sabotage
Assume for a moment that the bottleneck monopolist is free to set the access charge . Then the following result follows:
Result 3.6. An unregulated bottleneck monopoly does not sabotage.
Proof. >From the derivative of (3.1) with respect to we get that for each s an unregulated bottleneck monopoly that coexists with independent …rms sets = M = p (s)=". Hence Result 3.6 is well known. 25 Beard et al. (2001) explain the intuition when the subsidiary and independent …rms coexist. For an independent …rm the e¤ect of cost increases due to or s are exactly the same. Hence, a higher access charge or an increase in the intensity of sabotage has the same e¤ect on the subsidiary's revenue. Nevertheless, while a higher increases the margin earned by the bottleneck monopoly on sales to independent …rms, sabotage does not, and a higher access charge is always better than more sabotage. Exactly the same economics explains why a slightly higher access charge always reduces the intensity of sabotage in equilibrium:
Then the optimal intensity of sabotage falls with .
Proof. Straightforward di¤erentiation of (3.2) or (3.5) as the case may be yields @s o @ = D 0 dp ds < 0; with = d 2 ds 2 , the second order condition.
The general lesson of Results 3.6 and 3.7 is that sabotage is wrought by the successful regulation of the bottleneck monopoly's market power. One might be tempted to think that sometimes price regulation should be abandoned to avoid sabotage, but this is unlikely. For example, if the elasticity of demand is 1:1, M will be 10 times the downstream marginal cost c q (q 0 ); if " = 3, M will still be substantial, equal to 50% the downstream marginal cost c q (q 0 ). 26 Nevertheless, if the access charge is equal to marginal cost the monopolist sabotages to achieve the desired margin. Thus, unless sabotage is veri…able, some departure from marginal cost pricing is optimal; see Sand (2004).
The bottleneck monopoly doesn' t sabotage if the subsidiary is "small"
Consider now subsidiaries who coexist with independent …rms. A straightforward implication of monotonicity in m, is that at some point the subsidiary becomes too small to warrant sabotage;
this is Region D in Figure 3 . In particular, Lemma A.7 in Appendix A shows that for any > 0 there exists ( ) such that for all in [0; ( )] D ( ) p (0) " dp ds 0 (0) 0: i.e. the subsidiary's market share must be smaller than the elasticity of the derived demand for access ((3.7) is su¢ cient and necessary if sabotage is costless). This no-sabotage condition is useful because it relates incentives with observable market parameters. Now for a given ratio p and demand elasticity ", Table 1 shows the maximum market share of the subsidiary such that condition (3.7) holds. For example, if p = 0:2 (that is, the access charge is equivalent to 20% of the price, paid by …nal users) and " = 0:7, then the su¢ cient no-sabotage condition (3.7) holds for subsidiaries with market share of 14% or less.
Note that when the access charge is a small percentage of the …nal price (say 0:15 or less) and demand is inelastic, the su¢ cient condition holds only for quite small market shares. Moreover, if 0 (i.e. the access charge is …xed at or below marginal cost), the bottleneck monopolist will sabotage however small its market share.
Result 3.8. If p is small, demand is inelastic, and 0 (0) its not too large, then only very small subsidiaries do not sabotage.
We can now consider some applications.
Application: bottleneck monopolies with small p First consider two examples of Chilean services with small ratios p . In Chile's Central Interconnected System, high-voltage transmission costs are about 6% of the average wholesale monomic energy price 27 and current estimates indicate that the price elasticity of the residential demand for energy in Chile is about 0:3. 28 Hence, a market share of more than 0:3 6% = 1:8% is enough for condition (3.7) not to hold.
Consider now long distance. In Chile local …xed-line companies receive a per-minute access charge for originating and delivering long-distance calls, which is paid by independent carriers and currently equals Ch$5:07 per minute. 29 In turn, carriers charge on average Ch$171:10 per minute for international calls, and Ch$41:90 per minute for national calls. Hence p = 5:07 171:10 0:03 for international calls and p = 5:07 41:90 0:12 for national calls. Unfortunately, we don't have estimates for the elasticity of the demand for long distance calls. If it were similar to the 0:7 estimate by Taylor (1994) for the United States, then it would mean that only subsidiary's with a market share of at most 2:1% would meet the no-sabotage condition.
Application: downstream liberalization and sabotage Depending on initial conditions a "liberalization" may mean allowing independent …rms to compete with a vertically integrated incumbent; or allowing the upstream provider to enter the downstream market with a subsidiary (as when the 1996 Telecommunications Act allowed RBOCs to enter the InterLATA market in the United States).
Incumbents often retain large market shares after liberalization and the demand for such services is likely to be inelastic. The North-East quadrant of Table 1 suggests, thus, that sabotage should be a concern when independent …rms are allowed to enter to compete with a dominant vertically integrated incumbent. Consider, for example, electricity distribution, which can be unbundled 2 7 See Galetovic and Muñoz (2006). 2 8 The elasticity of demand and the share of distribution charges in the residential energy price is taken from Inostroza et al. (2004). 2 9 We thank Patricio Cáceres of Telefónica CTC Chile for kindly sharing data on access charges. In January 2007 $1 = Ch$540. from retailing. Current estimates indicate that the price elasticity of the residential demand for energy in Chile is about 0:3 and p is about 0:4. 30 Thus the no-sabotage condition would hold only if the incumbents'shares would fall from 100% today to 14% or less. More generally, if the elasticity of demand is 0:5 or less, any incumbent which retains more than 50% of the market will likely have incentives to sabotage.
A similar calculation was performed by Sibley and Weisman (1998a) to analyze the likely e¤ects on sabotage of allowing RBOCs to enter the interLATA market, and their parametrization yielded a threshold market share of 26%. Yet they concluded that sabotage would probably not be a concern, at least initially-RBOCs were new to the market and had to snatch market share from incumbents.
The bottleneck monopolist doesn' t sabotage if the subsidiary is very e¢ cient
E¢ ciency and sabotage The bottleneck monopolist will not sabotage if her subsidiary is very e¢ cient and excludes independent …rms by merely charging the unconstrained monopoly price. To see this note that such a subsidiary optimally sets p M < p (0) < p (s) for any s > 0. Hence
which falls with s. Hence:
Result 3.9. The bottleneck monopoly does not sabotage if the subsidiary e¢ ciently excludes.
Furthermore, Figure 3 also shows that at some point economies of scope become too strong for sabotage to be pro…table, regardless of the subsidiary's size m. Then even some subsidiaries who limit price in Figure 3 , will optimally choose not to sabotage.
To see why …x m arbitrarily at m. Note that for subsidiaries (m; ) who limit price when sabotage is not feasible
" dp ds and p p M (m; ). As increases and economies of scope become more intense, the term p (1 )c q p increases and d =ds (0; m; ) falls. For = 0 such that p M (m; 0 ) = p (0), this fraction equals 1=" and d =ds(0; m; 0 ) = 0. Thus, when 0 (0) > 0, there exists some continuous interval such that d =ds(0; m; 0 ) 0 (0) < 0. Since d ds (s; m; ) is decreasing in s, we know that the bottleneck monopoly will never sabotage. Essentially, when economies of scope are strong enough p is close to p M and sabotage is not worth its cost.
Application: e¢ cient exclusion is unlikely In antitrust cases it is sometimes claimed that vertical integration bene…ts consumers, because economies of scope lower prices. Our analysis shows that this claim is suspect because prices do not fall with vertical integration unless the subsidiary (m; ) is "considerably"more e¢ cient than independent …rms. To see this, we parametrize the cost di¤erences between the subsidiary and independent …rms that are necessary for e¢ cient exclusion. Figure 3 The ratio on the LHS is a lower bound such that e¢ cient exclusion is an equilibrium (for points inside Region A[i] the cost di¤erence is even higher and, since q M q 0 , average cost is below marginal cost at q M ). Because the ratio cannot be negative, it must be the case that " > 1 at the observed equilibrium price for e¢ cient exclusion to occur. Table 2 shows the minimum cost advantage that the subsidiary must enjoy for e¢ cient exclusion to be pro…table. If the observed elasticity of demand is close to 1, or is small relative to the independent …rm's marginal cost, the subsidiary's cost advantage has to be very large. For example, if " = 1:1 and = 0:1, the subsidiary's marginal cost has to be one-tenth, or 10% of an independent's …rm marginal cost, for e¢ cient exclusion to occur. And in any case, for plausible values of " and the monopolist's cost advantage needs to be substantial for e¢ cient exclusion to be pro…table. For example, if " = 2, even if increases …rms' costs by 50% ( = 0:5), the subsidiary's cost would need to be 75% the cost of an independent …rm. Hence:
To proceed, note that the frontier between Regions A[i] and A[ii] in
Result 3.10. Unless demand is very elastic, vertical integration bene…ts consumers only if the monopolist is substantially more e¢ cient than independent …rms. 20
The bottleneck monopolist doesn' t sabotage if the subsidiary is very ine¢ cient
Many authors have noted that sabotage becomes unattractive when the subsidiary is considerably less e¢ cient than independent …rms. 31 This, of course, also appears in our model: as can be seen in Figure 3 , for each m there is no sabotage if diseconomies of scope are strong enough. The economics is well known: the ine¢ cient subsidiary substitutes production of independent …rms, but earns a margin which is smaller than the access charge. Thus, substitution results in a net loss when the subsidiary's costs are high.
Yet in practice it is unlikely that a subsidiary will choose to refrain from sabotage because it is less e¢ cient than independent …rms. For one, if the bottleneck monopolist decides not to sabotage, then it should also prefer vertical separation and no subsidiary should be observed in the …rst place! For another, as we have already seen, an ine¢ cient subsidiary may operate precisely because it can sabotage and raise rivals'costs-as far as the sabotage decision is concerned, relative ine¢ ciencies must be assessed after sabotage has increased rival's costs.
Welfare
Vertical integration, sabotage and welfare
How does welfare vary with equilibrium sabotage? Because downstream …rms are perfectly competitive and make zero pro…ts, welfare equals the sum of the monopolist's pro…t and consumer surplus, both evaluated at s 0 , viz.
with exclusion and
with coexistence. Now note that s o is a function of and m. If the bottleneck monopoly excludes, then sabotage is more intense the smaller the subsidiary or the less intense are economies of scope. Because smaller and less e¢ cient subsidiaries make lower pro…ts and sabotage more, the following follows: Things are di¤erent when the subsidiary coexists. Here the bottleneck monopoly sabotages more when the subsidiary is more e¢ cient. Hence:
Result 3.12. When the subsidiary coexists, welfare may increase or fall with equilibrium sabotage.
Vertical integration and welfare A related but slightly di¤erent question is how vertical integration a¤ects welfare. The tradeo¤ is simple: with vertical integration economies of scope may be realized, but consumers pay more and independent …rms have higher costs.
The change in welfare when the bottleneck monopolist vertically integrates and sabotages, which is depicted in Figure 4 , is
Three of these four terms indicate a welfare loss. The …rst term in (3.10), which is the the shaded area in the …gure, is the welfare loss due to the fall of consumption-with vertical integration price increases, consumption falls and access charge revenues are lost. The second term, which is the gridded area in the …gure, is the higher cost that independent …rms have to bear. And sabotage has a direct cost, (s 0 ).
Figure 4 about here
But consider now the third term. We know that q M (s o ) q 0 , so that C(q M (so)) q M (so) c q (q 0 ). Thus, if is small, zero or negative, welfare must fall:
Result 3.13. If economies of scope are not too large, welfare falls with vertical integration. Figure 4 is positive whenever the subsidiary can realize economies of scope. With su¢ ciently large economies of scope, thus, welfare could increase with vertical integration, as we now show with a simulation.
Now the checkered area in
A simulation with "large"sabotage costs To explore the tradeo¤ between economies of scope and consumer welfare we consider a simple example. Assume that the demand for the …nal good is 250 6p; the total cost of production of a one-plant independent …rm is 100 + q 2 ; the access charge is …xed at = $2; and the cost of sabotage is 12; 500 s 2 . Then 11:8 independent …rms enter the market with vertical separation, Q = 118, p = $22, consumer welfare equals $1; 160 and aggregate welfare equals $1; 396. Note that in this example sabotage costs can be called "large": to increase the cost of independent …rms by 1% the bottleneck monopolist must spend 12; 500 0:01 = $125, or about 5% of total downstream production costs. occurs when the subsidiary coexists with = 0 and m = 10. Note that welfare uniformly increases with economies of scope for a given m, despite of the fact that sabotage intensi…es with economies of scope in Region C.
Variations in the intensity of sabotage can be gleaned better by looking at consumer welfare in Table 3 (b). We know that it must fall in regions B and C and reach its nadir along the frontier that separates both region. Then it can be seen that in this example, consumer welfare can fall up to 15% with vertical integration. Interestingly, there seem to be two types of pairs ( ; m) that hurt consumers the most. On the one hand, when economies of scope are very large, but the subsidiary is small (this case, however, seems unlikely, as economies of scope need to be very large for welfare to fall a lot). On the other hand, a large subsidiary (m 7, say) tends to sabotage more.
The price increases behind the welfare changes shown in Table 3 are signi…cant but not very large-at most 7% . One might thus be tempted to conclude that important but yet plausible economies of scope might be enough to compensate whatever losses consumers bear with vertical integration. 32 Yet this conclusion is probably not warranted, because we have assumed that the direct cost of sabotage is quite large. A smaller cost of sabotage signi…cantly enlarges the set of pairs ( ; m) such that aggregate welfare falls and then consumer losses will be compensated only if economies of scope are much larger.
Sabotage, vertical divestitures and welfare
Some recent papers have begun to analyze the costs and bene…ts of vertical divestitures (see Crew et al. [2005] and Sappington [2006b] ). In our model, Result 3.1 implies that a vertical divestiture bene…ts consumers whenever the bottleneck monopoly sabotages-p (0) < p (s) regardless of economies of scope. Moreover, because the subsidiary is a price taker, p (0) is the minimum price that consumers will pay when independent …rms coexist with the subsidiary. Hence:
If the subsidiary coexists, vertical divestitures do not hurt consumers.
On the other hand, a vertical divestiture hurts consumers if it prevents e¢ cient exclusion.
But, as we saw before, that is unlikely. For example, in our simulation, e¢ cient exclusion occurs only if the costs of the subsidiary are close to zero.
Our results are quite similar in spirit to Sappington's (2006b) , who studies vertical divestitures in a model where an incumbent …rm (the equivalent of the subsidiary) competes Bertrand with rivals of varying e¢ ciency. He …nds that economies of scope do not a¤ect the price that consumers pay when either the incumbent is the lowest-cost producer or the costs of rivals are su¢ ciently similar.
In both cases, the equilibrium price is determined by the costs of independent rivals, which are not a¤ected by economies of scope. Consequently, a vertical divestiture bene…ts consumers because the price falls when sabotage ceases, just as it does in our model.
How does a vertical divestiture a¤ect aggregate welfare? Crew et al. (2005) tackled this question with a Cournot duopoly, and found that welfare rises with a divestiture, unless economies of scope are substantial 33 . In our simulation (see table 4 (b)) a divestiture will increase aggregate welfare if, roughly speaking, economies of scope are larger in magnitude than the price increase prompted by sabotage in equilibrium.
Concluding remarks
The aim of this paper has been to relate the sabotage decision with observable market outcomes and parameters. This exercise yields two simple conditions which are a function of observable market parameters and tell when sabotage pays. Moreover, it shows that market outcomes are informative by themselves about the likelihood of sabotage. Yet our consolidation of the results present in the literature is incomplete, because we have built on three speci…c assumptions. To conclude we will comment on these assumptions and suggest some directions for further research.
Let us point out that assuming free entry, while not common in the literature, is not particularly restrictive. When writing regulations (either rules or statutes), a central question is: does it make sense to allow bottleneck monopolies to own subsidiaries, or is it better to prohibit vertical integration? This is, essentially, a question about the long-run performance of alternative regulatory regimes which will be inevitably a¤ected by entry. Moreover, such long-run analysis is useful because ex post regulation of sabotage is seldom e¤ective. For example, American courts have seldom upheld claims that sabotage raises rival's cost and violates Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. As mentioned by Goetz and McChesney (2006) : "For the most part, causes of action under §2 based essentially on allegations of raising rivals'costs have not fared well."In such a case the plainti¤ (the FTC or the DOJ, say) not only has to prove that the defendant has engaged in activities with the intention to monopolize the market and has injured the plainti¤, but also has to prove that competition has been harmed. The …rst requirement is daunting by itself, as the plainti¤ has to present material evidence that the defendant raised his costs. Expert testimony will usually Proof. Take any arbitrary production QM . (i) For a given m, costs are minimized when cq(qj) = cq(q 0 j ) since the cost function is convex in q. (ii) Suppose that qM < q0. Then cq(qM ) < cq(q0), a contradiction.
REMARK: Part (i) follows from cost minimization. Part (ii) says that in the long-run the monopolist will not install so many plants to have them produce below their MES. Of course, as assumed, regulatory and antitrust restrictions restrict m and may result in plants operating beyond their MES.
A.2. An implication of Property 1
We claim in section 3.2.2 that Property 1 (a downward-sloping marginal revenue curve) and convex c is su¢ cient for the second-order condition to hold when the bottleneck monopoly limit-prices. We now prove this. To prove the Proposition, the following lemma is useful:
Lemma A.4. Let P (Q) D 1 (Q). Then (i) D 0 (P (Q)) = 1 P 0 ; (ii) D 00 (P (Q)) = P 00
Proof. P (D(p)) p. Hence P 0 (D(p))D 0 1;
from which (i) follows after straightforward subsitutions. Next, totally di¤erentiating (A.3), P 00 (D(p))(D 0 ) 2 + P 0 (D(p))D 00 0;
from which (ii) follows.
Proof of Proposition A.3
The proposition is clearly true if D 00 0. Thus assume D 0 > 0 but Property 1 holds and c is convex. Use (i) in Lemma A.4 to substitute 1 P 0 for D 0 in (A.2) and (ii) to substitute P 00 (P 0 ) 3 for D 00 , and obtain
Now note that for all p pM , p (1 )cq p "
where the second equality follows from Lemma A.4 (i). Hence
But then
where the last inequality follows directly from Property 1 and the convexity of c. Last, existence of p > pM follows directly from continuity. Proof. From its de…nition we know that when the monopolist sabotages s max o then QM = D and all independent …rms are limit priced. But then we know that inside Region C in Figure 3 (sabotage with coexistence) so(m; ) is always smaller than s max o because @so @m > 0 and @so @ > 0. Similarly, we know that inside Region B in Figure 3 (sabotage with limit-pricing) so(m; ) is always smaller than s max o this time because @so @m < 0 and @so @ < 0.
A.4. A monopolist who owns a small subsidiary does not sabotage
Lemma A.7. (Minimum market share) For all > 0 there exists a market share ( ) such that for all ( ) D(p (0)) p (0) " dp ds 0 (0) 0
Proof. The proof is in two parts. First, for any > 0 we identify the market share ( ) for which the optimal intensity of sabotage is 0: Second, we show that a bottleneck monopolist who owns a subsidiary with market share smaller than ( ) does not sabotage. We know that 0 > D(p (0)) p (0) " dp ds 0 (0) and that D(p (0)) 1 p (0) " dp ds 0 (0) D(p (so)) 1 p (so) " dp ds 0 (so) = 0:
Hence, from a continuity argument, there exists ( ) 2 [0; 1] such that D(p (0)) ( ) p (0) " dp ds 0 (0) = 0: (A.6) >From (3.3) this implies that a monopolist who owns a subsidiary (m; ) such that
does not sabotage. The second part of the proof is direct: clearly, for any < ( ), the LHS of (A.6) is strictly negative.
B. Vertical integration without sabotage
In this appendix we formally derive Figure 2 .
B.1. Characterization of equilibria
To analyze vertical integration we study the monopolist's decision, which the next proposition characterizes. Basically, the result says that, depending on and m, the monopolist's subsidiary may exclude independent …rms, limit price or coexist acting as a price taker. The kink in occurs exactly where the subsidiary's market share is 100%.
The FOC for maximizing (B.5) are
Proof of part (i) We can rewrite (B.1) as follows
which means that if (B.1) holds then, pro…t maximization implies that the monopolist wants to set a price pM = (1 )cq[D(p )=m]=(1 1=") which is smaller than p . Consequently, the subsidiary e¢ ciently excludes independent …rms. We only have to show that the monopolist is better-o¤ integrating into the downstream market, that is
To see that that this is indeed the case note that
where the …rst inequality follows from pro…t-maximization and the second from cq D(p )
, because for all 2 [0; M ] there exists m = n = D(p )=q0 and 0 such that p (1 )cq(q0) = p =", i.e. pM = p . Since p = p0+ = cq(q0)+ , it follows that p (1 )cq(q0) = p + . Hence, p =" = p (1 )cq(q0) . This establishes the result.
Proof of part (ii) We can rewrite (B.2) as
Then, we have that pM > p which means that the monopolist cannot e¢ ciently exclude and must take price p . But the subsidiary grabs the whole market because the necessary FOC condition to maximize (B.5) holds at QM = D(p ).
To see that vertical integration is pro…table, note that the FOC implies that
which completes the proof.
Proof of part (iii)
We can rewrite (B.3) as p (1 )cq(D(p )=m) < , which implies that pM > p . In addition, p
(1 )cq(qM ) = satis…es the FOC, hence the subsidiary coexists with independent …rms and QM < D(p ). Now note that a subsidiary with = 0 and m < n sets qM = q0, and earns p cq(q0) = per unit sold. Hence, the monopolist is indi¤erent between integrating and not. For any subsidiary with > 0, the price-cost margin is for the last unit sold, and greater than for the inframarginal units. Hence, on average the monopolist earns higher pro…ts with vertical integration.
Proof of part (iv) Last, note that with diseconomies of scope ( < 0), p (1 )cq(qM ) = if and only if qM < q0. Hence the monopolist is better o¤ by not integrating into the downstream market.
B.2. Intuition
Before moving on, here we discuss the economics behind Proposition B.1. Figure B1 about here Figure B1 shows the demand curve confronted by the subsidiary for a given . Free entry implies that …rms are willing to produce any quantity demanded at price p . Thus the relevant demand curve is kinked with the traditional discontinuity of its marginal revenue curve, and the four types of equilibria summarized in the Proposition emerge.
To begin, assume that the subsidiary is very e¢ cient and its marginal cost curve is, say, MC1. Then the subsidiary ignores independent …rms and sets p = pM < p . Consequently, Figure 2 indicates that for (m; ) in Region I independent …rms are e¢ ciently excluded.
Clearly, the access charge is irrelevant inside Region I. On the other hand, is relevant for a subsidiary with marginal cost curve MC2 + , who limit-prices …rms. In this case the subsidiary enjoys of economies of scope and collects a unit margin higher than which increases with . Subsidiaries (m; ) who limit-price are in Region II of Figure 2 .
Next, as the proposition indicates, any monopolist with > 0 will at least coexist with …rms. Consider a monopolist with marginal cost curve MC3 + . Initially yields a cost advantage over …rms, and it always pays to take advantage of this margin until diminishing returns set in. After marginal costs reach p , the monopolist earns more by selling the input to downstream …rms and collecting per unit sold.
Last, in Region IV, where < 0, the bottleneck monopoly does not integrate into the downstream market because it would obtain a smaller margin than at any scale of production, even when = 0. This again highlights the importance of entry. If …rms were price takers but their number …xed, then an ine¢ cient monopolist would …nd it pro…table to set up a subsidiary and restrict production. But, as we have seen, entry e¤ectively transforms the subsidiary into a price taker in the downstream market and erodes any rents that could be appropriated by vertically integrating and restricting output.
C. Vertical integration with sabotage
We now show that if is low enough, the sabotage decision is characterized by Figure 3 . We proceed as follows. Lemma C.1 shows that there exist downward-sloping functions A (m), B (m) and C (m) like those depicted in Figure  3 . Then Lemma C.2 shows that they are ordered such as in the …gure. Last, we state a corollary that completes the characterization. In what follows it will be useful to de…ne function as
That is, function is the pro…t function gross of direct sabotage costs.
Lemma C.1. There exist the following continuous downward-sloping functions de…ned on (0; n ]:
i dp ds . This characterizes limit-pricers who set so = 0 but satisfy the FOC; REMARK Note that two di¤erent cases can occur for monopolists who coexist and are indi¤erent between sabotaging and not. First, the marginal cost function 0 may intersect the marginal bene…t function d ds only once. In that case equation (C.3) does not de…ne an implicit function when > 0 because it is not only satis…ed for those who are just indi¤erent, but for all monopolists with subsidiaries that coexist without sabotage. Additionally, the implicit function is obtained from d ds (0; m; C (m)) 0 (0) = 0, a case that can be treated like (i) changing the marginal utility function. Given that, we only consider the case where 0 and d ds intersect either twice or don't intersect at all. Then (so; m; ) (so) = (0; m; ) does indeed de…ne an implicit function.
Proof. The proof is an application of the Implicit Function Theorem. In each case we have an expression of the form ; which is clearly negative because, for a given s, increases with size and economies of scope. Proof of part (i) We show that for arbitrarily close to 1 there always exists an m such that A (m) = , that is, A gets as close as possible to 1 and the pair (m; ) satis…es equation (C.1). First note that equation (C.1) can be rewritten as Proof of part (ii) All subsidiaries (m; A (m)) limit price with so = 0 and the bottleneck monopoly always prefers to integrate. Then all such subsidiaries must have > 0, otherwise the bottleneck monopoly would rather remain vertically separated.
Proof of part (iii) With subsidiary (n ; B (n )) the bottleneck monopoly loses money with vertical integration and does not satisfy the participation constraint. Then B (n ) must lie below C (n ), which de…nes that participation constraint.
Proof of part (iv) Fix m and consider subsidiary (m; B (m)). Then the bottleneck monopolist sabotages just enough to prompt the subsidiary to limit price and grab the whole market. Now subsidiary (m; A (m)) also grabs the whole market, but then the bottleneck monopoly is indi¤erent between sabotaging and not. That subsidiary must be more e¢ cient than the one that prompts the monopolist to sabotage just enough to limit price, that is, A (m) > B (m); otherwise the subsidiary would only coexist.
Proof of part (v) First, when m < m C we apply a similar argument as in (iv). Fix m and consider subsidiary (m; B (m)). This subsidiary must coexist with a market share strictly less than one and must be more e¢ cient than subsidiary (m; C (m)). Now, when m > m C , we know that: C (m) < 0; B (m C ) > C (m C ) = 0; and B (n ) < C (n ) < 0. By continuity they must intersect at some point m , and the intersection is unique because on B (m) pro…ts monotonically fall as m increases and along C (m) pro…ts are zero by de…nition. Obviously B (m ) = C (m ) < 0. This completes the proof. > 0 such that the bottleneck monopolist strictly prefers to vertically integrate, does not sabotage and has < 1.
(v) E is the open set of all subsidiaries (m; ) with min(0; C (m)) such that the bottleneck monopolist strictly prefers to remain vertically separated.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the former analysis.
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Table 1
Largest market share such that the bottleneck monopoly doesn't sabotage (in percentage) 0. Figure 1 shows how the subsidiary's sales depend on the intensity of sabotage. As the intensity of sabotage increases, so does the equilibrium price. The subsidiary moves up its marginal cost curve and its market share increases. When the intensity of sabotage reaches s , the subsidiary grabs the whole market.
Note that the subsidiary's marginal cost includes the access charge τ ---when increasing sales the subsidiary sells less access to independent firms and incurs an opportunity cost. A very efficient subsidiary excludes all independent firms simply by setting its unconstrained monopoly price; this is Region I, where economies of scope are large. In Region II the subsidiary limit prices competitors. All sales are made by the subsidiary, but the price is set by the minimum average cost of a potential entrant. Finally, in Region III the subsidiary coexists with independent firms, which set the price (see Figure 1 ). Note that all lines stop when τ n m = , where τ n is the number of independent firms that would enter the market when the access charge is τ and the monopolist does not establish a subsidiary. This is the maximum number of independent firms that will ever enter the market in equilibrium. Figure 4 shows the change in welfare wrought by vertical integration when the subsidiary and independent firms coexist. The shaded area is the welfare loss due to the fall of consumption. The gridded area is the welfare loss due to the increase in the independent firms' cost preoduced by sabotage. Last, the checkered area is the welfare gain produced by the subsidiary's economies of scope. Note that the direct cost of sabotage incurred by the bottleneck monopolist is not shown in the figure. 
Demand
Figure B1 Vertical integration with no sabotage
Demand Figure B1 shows how the vertical integration decision depends on the subsidiary's cost. A low-cost subsidiary with marginal cost curve MC 1 will set a monopoly price below p τ ; this is efficient exclusion, Region I en Figure 2 . A subsidiary with a marginal cost curve like MC 2 will limit price independent firms by charging p τ ; this is region 2 in Figure 2 . Subsidiaries with still higher costs, like MC 3 will, coexist; this is Region III in Figure 2 .
